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Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: 
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By Fairfax Leary, Jr.* and David Frisch** 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
As in the past, there were no significant developments or trends in the few 
decisions on conflict of laws points. The text of U.C.C. section 1-105,1 the 
Code's general choice-of-law provision, speaks comprehensively of "the transac-
tion." Yet recent cases and a draft of the proposed Personal Property Leasing 
Act2 take an issue-oriented approach, thus giving the parties greater freedom to 
specify choice of law. Following the formulation in section 187 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of the Conflict of Laws, the draft Leasing Act supports party 
choice in the absence of some significant forum policy that requires overriding 
that choice. 3 
*Mr. Leary is a member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and District of Columbia bars and 
Distinguished Senior Professor of Law at The Delaware Law School of Widener University in 
Wilmington. 
**Mr. Frisch is a member of the Rhode Island bar and Associate Professor of Law at the same 
university. 
Don L. Baker of Austin, Texas, and Fairfax Leary, Jr. are cochairmen of the Subcommittee on 
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title. The following members of the 
subcommittee contributed to the writing of this survey: Anthony Adams, Marvin E. Barkin, Calvin 
W. Corman, Joseph J. Gazzoli, Lawrence B. Hunt, Dennis S. Kayes, Ann Lousin, Susan M. 
Mann, John E. Murray, Jr., Jeffrey L. Raney, Michael D. Strobehn (assisted by Beverly A. 
Zimmerman), Victor A. Vilaplana, and William R. Waddell. 
Editor's note: This article and the one that follows are a continuation of the survey of 1984 
developments under the Uniform Commercial Code. Other sections of the survey appeared in the 
May 1985 issue of The Business Lawyer. 
1. All references to the U.C.C. are to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1978 Official Text. 
2. The Leasing Act is being drafted under the aegis of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). The reporters are Ronald DeKoven, Esq. of the New York 
bar and Professor James A. Martin of the Michigan Law School. The draft was submitted for a 
first reading to the commissioners at their summer 1984 meeting at Keystone, Colorado, July 
27-August 3, 1984. It has not been approved by the commissioners, the committee, or the reporters. 
3. Draft of Personal Property Leasing Act No. 5, at 20-21 (Mar. 3, 1985) (not approved by the 
NCCUSL, its subcommittee, or the reporters). The proposed language may not be used to ascertain 
the legislative meaning of any promulgated final law. Subsection (a) of§ 107 of the draft Leasing 
Act reads as follows: 
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In the consumer context, the Leasing Act draft, both in choice of law and in 
choice of forum, 4 negates certain choice-of-law agreements in order to protect 
consumers from the inconvenience of a distant forum5 or strange rules of law. In 
cases considering commercial transactions involving banks, even when U.C.C. 
section 4-102(2) is not applicable, courts have adopted the law of the state in 
which the bank is located.6 
Perhaps consideration should be given to whether both the Code and the 
proposed Leasing Act should also permit the parties to agree to be governed by 
the terms of a particular trade practice code, even though it is not, as such, the 
law of any particular jurisdiction.7 
In one leasing case, In re loop Hospital Partnerships,8 the court noted that 
under U.C.C. sections 9-102 and 9-103, the applicable law could differ depend-
ing upon the issue, that is, "repossession and resale" versus "validity," rather 
than selecting one jurisdiction for the entire transaction, thus apparently adopt-
ing an "issue" approach. 
In Hammermill Paper Co. v. Pipe Systems, lnc.,9 Hammermill sued Pipe in 
Pennsylvania for breach of warranty. Seeking indemnification, Pipe impleaded 
Subject to subsections (c) and (d), the parties may agree that the law of this State or of another 
jurisdiction govern their rights and duties under the lease if the particular issue is one that the 
parties may resolve by agreement under this [Act]. Even if the issue is not one that the parties 
may resolve by agreement under this [Act], the parties may agree that the law of this State or of 
another jurisdiction govern their rights and duties under the lease unless: 
( 1) the law chosen is that of a jurisdiction having no substantial relationship with the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice; or 
(2) application of the law chosen would be contrary to the fundamental policy of the 
jurisdiction whose law would otherwise be chosen by the applicable choice of law rules of 
this State, including subsection (b). 
Subsection (b) directs the court to apply "the law of the jurisdiction that has the most significant 
relation with the lease." Subsection (c) states a special rule for consumer leases, namely, either the 
law of the residence of the consumer "at the time the lease agreement becomes enforceable or within 
30 days thereafter or in which the goods are to be used." Any other choice is without effect. 
4. Id. § 108, at 23. 
5. Id. §§ 107 (c), (d). 
6. Banco Nacional de Desarrollo v. Mellon Bank, 726 F.2d 87, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callag-
han) 1651 (3d Cir. 1984); Barclays Discount Bank, Ltd. v. Bogharian Bros., 568 F. Supp. 1116 
(C.D. Cal. 1983); Israel Discount Bank, Ltd. v. Rosen, 59 N.Y.2d 428, 452 N.E.2d 1213, 465 
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1983). 
7. The connict-of-laws provisions in both the U.C.C. and the Leasing Act make no reference to 
trade practice. In Banco Nacional de Desarrollo v. Mellon Bank, 726 F.2d at 90 n.5, 37 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 1655 n.5, the Third Circuit stated that the Uniform Customs and Practices for 
Documentary Credits did not qualify as "the substantive law of a state" for adoption by the parties. 
8. 35 Bankr. 929, 938, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1679, 1692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983). 
9. 581 F. Supp. 1189, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The court cited 
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 ( 1964 ), Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws§ 147, and Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1311-13 (3d Cir. 
1978). In considering the second part of Pennsylvania's analysis and the Restatement's flexible two-
part analysis, the court found that the issue of products liability law involved policy interests of 
considerable consequence to Pennsylvania because the damages occurred in Pennsylvania. See also 
First Nat'! Bank v. Insurance Centers, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (citing 
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its supplier under a distributorship agreement that designated Texas law, and 
also asserted a products liability claim. The third-party defendant moved for 
summary judgment based on Texas law and a one-year contractual bar to 
claims in the distributorship agreement. 
The court applied Texas law to the third-party warranty claim and granted 
the supplier's motion. The distributorship agreement did not govern the strict 
liability claim, however, and the court turned to Pennsylvania's general choice-
of-law rules in tort and strict liability cases. It determined that Pennsylvania 
law applied. Again, this was an "issue" approach. 
HYBRID SALES AND SERVICE CASES 
A distributorship agreement calling for a "host of service responsibilities" 
nevertheless was subject to article 2 as the "sale of goods was the raison d'etre of 
the Agreements."10 A printing contract was held to be a sale of the finished 
magazines so that no consideration was needed for a modification under U.C.C. 
section 2-209. 11 
In other cases, even though the contract was held not to be subject to article 2 
either as a service contract12 or as a federal contract, 13 the provisions of the Code 
were applied. Of seventeen cases reviewed, fourteen applied the U.C.C. on one 
basis or another,14 indicating the need, in the area of commercial service 
contracts, for more available guidance than the common law provides. 
In Hudson v. Town & Country True Value Hardware, lnc., 15 the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, unlike the courts that applied the U.C.C. at the parties' 
Phillips v. Englehart, 437 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968), applying the law of a state to which 
" 'some element of the contract is properly referrable' "). The Insurance Centers court also likened 
the U.C.C. § 1-105 tests to the rule of Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 
(1927). Section 106(a)(2) of the draft Leasing Act more concretely permits the disregard of the 
contractual choice-of-law clause when its purpose is to evade a fundamental policy of the otherwise 
applicable jurisdiction's law. 
10. WICO Corp. v. Willis Indus., 567 F. Supp. 352, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 20 
(N .D. Ill. 1983 ). An installation contract for components of a cold storage room had as its dominant 
aspect the sale of the coinponents, the trial court concluded; on appeal, both parties agreed that the 
U.C.C. applied. Mayflower Farms v. Tech-Mark, Inc., 64 Or. App. 121, 666 P.2d 1384, 37 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 25 (1983); accord O'Keefe Elevator Co. v. Second Ave. Properties, Ltd., 216 
Neb. 170, 343 N.W.2d 54, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1100 (1984) (wheelchair lift, parties 
tried as U.C.C. case). In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., No. 37 W.D. Appeal Docket 1984 
(Pa. Feb. 22, 1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the U.C.C. applied to a contract 
for the construction of a 1 ,000-foot self-unloading vessel that, although immovable during the 
special construction, would be movable after launching. 
1 I. Gross Valentino Printing Co. v. Clarke, 120 Ill. App. 3d 907, 458 N.E.2d 1027, 37 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1460 (1983). 
12. Liberty Fin. Management Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1471 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
13. Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 730 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(lease and sale of tugboat). 
14. Several are not specifically discussed. 
15. 666 S.W.2d 51, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 6 (Tenn. 1984). There were separate 
contracts, one for the real estate and one for the personalty. The latter was conditioned upon the 
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behest,16 consolidated two separate contracts covering the sale of a business and 
applied the dominant interest test, treating the whole as a sale of real estate 
breached by the buyer. The court reversed a decision of the court of appeals, 
which required separate awards of damages for the personalty contract and the 
real estate contract, and reinstated the trial court's award to the seller of the 
difference between the total of the two contract prices and the price received by 
the seller on a subsequent sale to another. 
ARTICLE 2-SALES 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
One situation not well handled by the Code, in view of its statute of frauds, is 
the obligation, if any, of a subcontractor submitting an oral offer to be used by a 
contractor in its bid for a contract. 17 This problem arose in H.B. Alexander & 
Son v. Miracle Recreation Equipment Co. 18 The court refused to allow the 
supplier to use the statute of frauds to escape from a bad deal. Ignoring certain 
contentions of the parties,19 the court concluded that the parties, by their conduct 
and course of dealing, had waived compliance with the statute of frauds. 20 
The result is correct, but the use of waiver and course of dealing can be 
faulted. 21 The court would have been on firmer ground had it based its 
closing of the land sale. The land sale was conditioned upon the buyer's obtaining financing. Since 
the buyer's efforts to obtain financing "were inadequate," the trial court found the buyer in default. 
16. See O'Keefe Elevator Co. v. Second Ave. Properties, Ltd., 216 Neb. 170, 343 N.W.2d 54, 37 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1100 (1984). 
17. U.C.C. § 2-205 on firm offers does not solve the problem, as it requires the irrevocable offer 
by a merchant to be in a signed writing. Also, many subcontractor-general contractor cases fall 
outside the Code as service contracts, not sales of goods. 
18. 314 Pa. Super. 1, 460 A.2d 343, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 750 (1983). 
19. Alexander, the general contractor, had, upon receiving the award, sent a vendor's order as an 
unanswered memorandum to a merchant. Miracle responded by arguing that the order was 
insufficient because it did not indicate that it was confirming a contract and the clause "to make any 
agreement valid sign, date and return copy at once. Advise definite shipping date and if by rail or 
truck" was an impermissible condition precedent. Id. at 3 n.2, 460 A.2d at 344 n.2, 36 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. at 751 n.2. 
20. Recognizing the importance of the bidding issue, the court said: 
It is essential that general contractors be allowed to accept and rely on telephone bids from 
subcontractors in arriving at their final bids since time is often an important factor. Clearly 
[Miracle] was aware of this generally accepted custom and in fact often used this practice in its 
transactions with general contractors. 
Id. at 5-6, 460 A.2d at 345, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 752-53. 
21. The relevance of course of conduct, or course of dealing and even usage of trade, lies in their 
use in de1ermining the meaning to be given to the terms of an agreement, not in making the 
agreement enforceable in the teeth of U.C.C. § 2-201. Tot~lly ignored by the court was comment 2 
to U.C.C. § 1-102, which provides that "the statute of frauds found in Section 2-201 ... does not 
explicitly preclude oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, but a fair reading denies enforce-
ment to such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unenforceable." It is noteworthy that there is no 
mention of "waiver" in U.C.C. § 1-103. 
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conclusions on an estoppel exception to the statute of frauds under U.C.C. 
section 1-103. 22 
The merchant's exception to the statute of frauds, avoided by the court in the 
preceding case, arose in Great Western Sugar Co. v. Lone Star Donut Co. 23 The 
writing sent by the seller seven weeks after the alleged oral agreement con-
cluded, "This letter is a written confirmation of our agreement. Please sign and 
return to me the enclosed counterpart of this letter signalling your acceptance of 
the above agreement."2• 
The court ignored the difference between compliance with the statute of 
frauds and the benefits of a signed written agreement which would preclude 
much litigation over its terms. Should it not be possible while confirming an oral 
contract to try for a written contract in addition? The court laconically ruled 
that "[a] true confirmation requires no response."25 This may be true, but to 
have a written agreement to eliminate potential controversy requires writings 
signed by both parties. 
Perhaps with more careful drafting, the dual purpose can be served. The key 
may be in the use of the words "signaUing your acceptance" of this agreement. 
What would the judge have done with a sentence requesting a signed return 
"signalling your concurrence that all of the terms and conditions herein stated 
are a part of our contract"26 ? 
Issues regarding the sufficiency of the writings and whether a check for 
$250,000 brought a contract to buy an $8.85 million aircraft within the partial 
payment rule of U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c) arose in Songbird jet Ltd. v. Amax, 
Inc.21 The judge ruled incorrectly that the statute requires that one document, 
on its own, must be "sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made." 28 But the judge agreed that a check for $250,000 would indeed be 
22. A promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds has been applied before. See, e.g., 
Allen M. Campbell Co., Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Virginia Metal Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 930, 36 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 384 (4th Cir. 1983); Northwest Potato Sales, Inc. v. Beck, 37 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1468 (Mont. 1984 ). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 139 (1981); Annot.-Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of Statute of Frauds, 56 
A.L.R.3d 1037 (1974). 
23. 567 F. Supp. 340, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 721 F.2d 510 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
24. 567 F. Supp. at 342, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 37. 
25. Id. at 342, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 38. 
26. The imprecision of the English language is indicated here. "Acceptance" can be misunder-
stood as being used with the meaning "This is an offer needing a legal acceptance." Alternatively, 
"acceptance" can mean a request for a written concurrence that the "confirmation" correctly stated 
everything contained therein. Of course, for a memorandum to be "in confirmation," it must use 
words such as "as per agreement," "in confirmation of," or "sold to buyer." Howard Constr. Co. v. 
Jeff Cole Quarries, Inc., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1040, 1047 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
27. 581 F. Supp. 912, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 431(S.D.N.Y.1984). 
28. Id. at 922, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 441. The judge overlooked the explanation of the 
language in comment 1 stating that all "that is required is that the writing afford a basis for 
believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction." Fortunately, the one document 
position is not shared by all courts, nor even by some members of the same court. See, e.g., East Eur. 
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"unintelligible," or at least "extraordinary ,"29 unless referable to an oral agree-
ment of some sort. 
Section 2-201 (1) clearly states that a sufficient writing must contain a 
quantity term. Slocomb Industries, Inc. v. Chelsea Industries30 held that a 
writing is sufficient if it "indicates that the quantity to be delivered under the 
contract is a party's requirements or output."31 Unfortunately, not all courts 
have been so commercially minded when presented with open quantity terms.32 
CONTRACT FORMATION 
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 
There is a difference between "sales in law" and "sales in practice." The 
Code's attempt to harmonize the two may work well enough for the large 
organization with batteries of forms and with personnel carefully trained in 
their use. But for smaller businesses, "one form fits all" seems to be the rule. 
American Bronze Corp. v. Streamway Products33 illustrates the chameleon-
like nature of purchase order forms. The central element is the purchase order 
number used for transactional identification and processing. On its face, as 
worded, the purchase order appears to be an offer.34 But a professional buyer 
may use the form in two other ways. One would be as an acceptance of an offer 
to sell, and some courts have, in certain circumstances, accepted its use for that 
purpose.35 Another would be as a confirmation of an oral contract. 
American Bronze involved four transactions in which the buyer, following 
what had been done for more than twenty years, "would first call in the order 
by telephone and then follow it up with a written purchase order at which time 
[the seller] would begin production."36 
After three purchase orders were placed, the seller began production and then 
refused to. deliver. Its stated reason was that the buyer had placed with other 
Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., 572 F. Supp. 702, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
29. 581 F. Supp. at 923, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 442 (citing Anostario v. Vicinanzo, 59 N.Y.2d 
662, 664, 450 N.E.2d 215, 216, 463 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (1983) (mem.) (quoting Burns v. 
McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 232, 135 N.E. 273, 273 (1922))). 
30. 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
31. Id. at 1548 (citing Eastern Dental Corp. v. Isaac Masel Co., 502 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. Pa. 
1980)). See In re Estate of Frost, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), 
where, in an analogous situation, the court held that "all wood sawable" was a valid quantity term. 
32. See generally Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of the UCC's 
Substantive Provisions-The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 811. 
33. 8 Ohio App. 3d 223, 456 N.E.2d 1295, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 687 (1982). 
34. See, e.g., J.B. Moore Elec. Contractor, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 221 Va. 745, 
273 S.E.2d 553, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1224 (1981). 
35. See, e.g., Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mack Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978 
(1975). On the other hand, a purchase order may merely evidence an offer rather than a prior oral 
contract. See Nations Enter., Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655, 24 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828 (1978). 
36. 8 Ohio App. 3d at 227, 456 N.E.2d at 1300, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 691. 
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sellers purchase orders that seller could also have filled. The fourth purchase 
order was rejected and returned four days after it was placed.37 
Crucial to a determination of liability on the fourth transaction is what was 
said by the seller when receiving the telephone order.38 Apparently, the issue of 
the fourth transaction was not raised on appeal.39 If it was, the court's treatment 
of the previous purchase orders as offers accepted under U.C.C. section 2-206 
by the beginning of production precluded a finding that the return of the fourth 
purchase order was a breach. 
In re Isis Foods, lnc. 40 is a case in which on receipt of a purchase order, the 
seller shipped the goods and also sent an invoice containing different terms. 
Which was the acceptance? The buyer's purchase order was F.O.B. destination, 
and the invoice contained the term "Our liability ceases upon delivery of the 
merchandise to the carrier." If the shipment occurred before the seller dis-
patched the invoice, and there is some indication of this, at best the invoice was a 
request for modification not accepted by the buyer. If the dispatch of the invoice 
occurred before the shipment, it could constitute a counteroffer, or if it was 
construed as or contained "a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance," 
a U.C.C. section 2-207 question would arise. Interesting, from the viewpoint of 
contract interpretation, is the court's conclusion that even if part of the contract, 
"the term in the invoice . . . does not clearly negate the provision that ... 
defendant bore the responsibility for delivery of the goods [to buyer] .... "41 Not 
made clear, however, is just how the two terms could be construed as being in 
harmony.42 
37. At one point, the court appeared to find an offer in the purchase order and an acceptance in 
the beginning of production. Hence, when no production was begun, there was no acceptance. 
U.C.C. § 2-204(1). 
38. Without discussing what was said, the trial court characterized the purchase orders as 
"confirming a telephone order." Trial Court's Finding of Fact 5 adopted by the court of appeals. 
8 Ohio App. 3d at 226, 456 N.E.2d at 1298, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 689. 
39. It was not discussed, and the court of appeals, after referring to the finding as to the three 
preceding orders, stated, "We agree and hold that the parties did enter into the three contracts in 
issue," 8 Ohio App. 3d at 227, 456 N.E.2d at 1300, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 692. Added confusion 
results from the court's discussion of the statute of frauds. First, the court seemed to treat the 
purchase order as a U.C.C. § 2-201(2) confirmatory memorandum, and then it stated that the 
seller's acceptance (apparently referring to the beginning of production) "was sufficient to indicate 
that these contracts for sale had been made." Id. at 228, 456 N.E.2d at 1301, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
at 692. This does not seem to fit any of the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-201. 
40. 38 Bankr. 48, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1134 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983). 
41. Id. at 50, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1137. 
42. If not in harmony, and if the invoice was sent first, see id. at 49, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 
1136, there would be conflicting terms, and the Code term under U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(b) places the 
risk of loss on the seller until destination, as the court held. Otherwise, the court might have 
considered the invoice term an "agreement otherwise" under U.C.C. § 2-509(4). If so, why was it 
not a "material alteration"? If the shipment occurred first, constituting an acceptance of the 
purchase order, the invoice could only be a U.C.C. § 2-209(1) request for modification. 
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South Hampton Co. v. Stinnes Corp.43 adds a desirable gloss to U.C.C. 
section 2-206(1 )(a). 44 Though performance may be a reasonable manner of 
acceptance, when the particular performance occurs under circumstances that 
cause the offeror reasonably to doubt whether the performance is intended as an 
acceptance, a refusal of the offeree to confirm that intention will preclude the 
performance from operating as an acceptance. 
]. Baranello & Sons v. Hausmann Industries, lnc. 45 indicates the care with 
.which courts expect the parties to express themselves. The negotiations started 
with a telephone bid from a subcontractor to supply a bidding contractor with 
certain wardrobes that differed in only one respect from the state's required 
design. The subcontractor claimed that its design would meet state approval. It 
developed that it would not. After much discussion and attempts to gain state 
approval, the contractor wrote the subcontractor a letter expressly superseding 
prior letters, specifying that all work would be in accordance with state 
specifications and increasing the price by $17 ,375. The subcontractor replied 
with a letter three days later indicating that the additional cost of $17,375 was 
for "[a]dditional costs for amending specifications, method of assembly and 
construction of wardrobes to meet F.D.C. [state] requirements."46 But objection 
was made to the subcontractor's drawings, and it could not satisfy the state. 
When sued, the subcontractor argued that its letter was not intended to 
constitute an acceptance and that the parties had not reached agreement on the 
logistics of shipping the wardrobes to a third party who was to supply certain 
molding. The court ruled that defendant's subjective intent was irrelevant, that 
there was an objective intent to contract, even with a material term left open,47 
and that because of defendant's refusal to comply, the court could fashion a 
remedy. 
43. 733 F.2d 1108, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1137 (5th Cir. 1984). 
44. The contract was for a ten-year period. Buyer had an option to cancel if seller did not build 
certain facilities to bring the oil to buyer by pipeline. Seller had the option to accept the cancellation 
or offer oil from another source for the balance of the contract. Proper notice of cancellation was 
given when the facilities were not constructed, but seller refused to accept it and continued deliveries 
from an alternate source. Buyer inquired whether seller was exercising its option to complete the 
contract from that alternate source. Seller merely replied that oil was available. After some 
negotiations between buyer, seller, and the users buying from Stinnes, all buyers cancelled and seller 
sued; buyer counterclaimed. Seller claimed it had exercised its contract by conduct. The court found 
otherwise. 
45. 571 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
46. Id. at 338. 
47. The court quoted from Kleinschmidt Div. of SCM Corp. v. Futuronics Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 
972, 363 N.E.2d 701, 395 N.Y.S.2d 151, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 422 (1977): "It is no 
longer true that dispute over material terms inevitably prevents formation of a binding contract. 
What is true ... is that when a dispute over material terms manifests a lack of intention to contract, 
no contract results." 571 F. Supp. at 341. If the term prevents the court from fashioning a remedy, 
lack of objective intention to contract is conclusive. 
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INDEFINITENESS AND OPEN TERMS 
Many contract terms left open by the parties can be supplied if the words and 
conduct of the parties, considered objectively, establish the requisite intent to 
contract and if there is a reasonably certain basis on which to construct a 
remedy. 
Three cases dealt with the parties' failure to define the duration of their 
contractual relationship.'8 U.C.C. section 2-309(2) provides that such a contract 
is valid for a reasonable time though terminable by either party at any time 
subject to the reasonable notice requirement of U.C.C. section 2-309(3). The 
cases confirm that the reasonableness of a time period is a question of fact. In 
one case, the trial judge ruled that termination of a distributorship occurred 
prematurely.'9 The Ninth Circuit ruled, correctly, that such a contract was 
terminable at the will of either party. The only requirements were that the 
notice be sent in good faith and that the reasonableness of the notice period be 
judged by the amount of time necessary to look for a new source of supply. 
In re Pennsylvania Tire Co. 60 illustrates the many problems that occur in the 
termination of a multiproduct distributorship agreement. First, the bankruptcy 
judge held that since the parties had dealt with each other for ten years, the 
reasonable period for validity had run. Relying on a clause in the agreement 
and oral testimony, the judge ruled that the parties had agreed on termination 
without any prior notice. As to U.C.C. section 2-309(2), he then said, "Indeed it 
is possible to find that, as between seasoned merchants, certainly an apt 
description of these parties, termination without prior notice is not commercially 
unreasonable"61 and so not unconscionable. Then the judge, relying on pre-
Code agency law, buttressed his holding of no liability by stating that "any 
agreement found to exist is unenforceable for lack of mutuality."62 
Apparently, a different result could have been reached under U.C.C. section 
2-306 had the distributor been given an exclusive territory or had it handled 
only the supplier's tires. 63 The court did hold that the distributor was entitled to 
a setoff for future adjustments it would have to make with those who had 
purchased tires from it and who would, based on past experience, have claims. 
Also, the supplier was awarded interest on unpaid invoices, but only at the 
statutory rate of 6% to July 30, 1980, and 8% thereafter,64 not at the rates of 
12 % to 20 % that it had charged. Interest on past-due invoices was not charged 
until late in 1979, and no payments of such interest had been made by the 
48. Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Inc., 719 F.2d 1465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 466 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Pennsylvania Tire Co., 26 Bankr. 663, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Mayflower Farms v. Tech-Mark, Inc., 64 Or. App. 
121, 666 P.2d 1384, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 25 (1983). 
49. Zidell Explorations, 719 F.2d 1465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 466. 
50. 26 Bankr. 663, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). 
51. Id. at 670, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419. 
52. Id. at 671, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 419. 
53. U.C.C. § 2-306(2) ends the lack of mutuality argument by creating a best efforts obligation 
on the part of each party. 
54. 26 Bankr. at 669; 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 416. 
.i 
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distributor. Hence, the supplier failed in its attempt to justify its higher-than-
statutory rates of interest based on course of performance and the distributor's 
failure to object. 
Lapeyrouse Grain Corp. v. Tallant55 involved farmers delivering grain to a 
dealer's storage bins under an oral agreement and a course of dealing that the 
grain was "unpriced," meaning that there was no sale until the farmers fixed 
the price. No specific pricing date was fixed. The dealer sent checks to the 
farmers based on its theretofore-undisclosed "cut-off date," a date on which the 
price was two cents a bushel lower than the day before and eight cents lower 
than on the following day. The farmers sued in conversion. The court held that 
the farmers' testimony was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether 
the arrangement was a bailment or a sale. A judgment in conversion for the 
farmers was affirmed. 56 
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Industries, Inc., 57 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed by necessity, on a two-to-two vote, a ruling of no 
contract. As the trial judge noted with some amazement, "The claim in excess of 
95 million dollars, together with a counterclaim, is based on a two-page letter 
between two giant corporations."58 The letter, signed at the ceremonial signing 
of a major contract for the purchase of one vessel, led to a dispute whether it was 
an enforceable option or merely an agreement to negotiate an option. By its 
express terms, the letter was "an offer to enter into an option agreement"59 to 
have Litton construct one to five additional vessels for Bethlehem. But several 
terms were left open.60 Subsequent negotiations on the open terms were unsuc-
55. 439 So. 2d 105, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 405 (Ala. 1983). 
56. The court said: "We find that the evidence of record concerning the storage agreement is 
sufficient to present a jury question as to whether the delivery was a bailment or a sale." Id. at 109, 
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 408. 
57. No. 37 W.D. Appeal Docket 1984 (Pa. Feb. 22, 1985) aff'g by necessity 321 Pa. Super. 357, 
468 A.2d 748, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1059 (1983). Three supreme court justices took no 
part; two voted to affirm; and two, to reverse. 
58. 321 Pa. Super. at 361, 468 A.2d at 749, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1062. 
59. Plaintiff's exh. 4. Id. at 363, 468 A.2d at 750, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1062. "We hereby 
extend to you an offer to enter into an option agreement." Id. at 362, 468 A.2d at 750, 37 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 1062. Bethlehem replied, "We ... accept your offer of an option." Id. at 364, 468 
A.2d at 751, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1064. Two justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
hold that the acceptance did not meet the offer. The two justices stated, but then ignored the fact, 
that Litton signed the Bethlehem letter under the words, "Agreed to." 
60. Among the terms left open was a mutually agreed-upon index for price escalation "such as" 
two mentioned indices. At the time of the exercise of the option, an "appropriate clause" was to be 
included in the contract to provide for quarterly escalations. The terms and specifications, after 
reference to an attached set, were to contain "any other mutually agreed to terms and conditions" 
and a clause giving Bethlehem the right to cancel "upon payment of costs." The district judge in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania was undoubtedly aware of the difficulties price escalation can 
cause, from that district's experience in Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 
53, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) I (W.D. Pa. 1980) (settled after argument on appeal with an 
agreed vacation of the order of the district court). The district judge stated that one ground of his 
decision was that, on the evidence before him, there was no basis on which the missing terms could 
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cessful, and Bethlehem sued. The proper issue, of course, is whether each party 
had sufficiently manifested an intent to have an open price contract. 
By a four-to-three vote, a seven-judge panel of Pennsylvania's superior court 
affirmed the no-contract decision of the trial court. The superior court held that 
the requisite intent to enter into a binding agreement was absent because so 
many terms were left to future negotiation. In addition, even if the intent could 
be found, the indefiniteness caused by the number of open terms could not be 
remedied under U.C.C. section 2-204(3) because there was no reasonably 
certain basis for filling in those terms consistently with what was expressed to 
provide an appropriate remedy.61 The two supreme court justices who voted for 
affirmance found no contract because "an offer to enter into an option agree-
ment" was not accepted by a letter stating, "we accept the option," even though 
the purported acceptance was signed "agreed to" by the original offeror. The 
trial court's finding of a lack of intent to have a contract with open price terms 
was also affirmed by the two voting for affirmance. Missed was an opportunity 
to rule that when the manifest intent was not to follow the Code's "gap filler" 
result, the court should risk that only an "agreement to agree'" had been made 
subject only to an obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
That U.C.C. section 2-207 was not intended for use when major terms are in 
dispute is a lesson of Howard Construction Co. v. Jeff-Cole Quarries, Inc.,62 in 
which the response to the seller's proposal was a purchase order containing 
considerable price changes. The purchase order was not construed as an 
expression of acceptance of the proposal. Even if it had been so construed under 
U.C.C. section 2-305, there was no evidence of an intent to contract with an 
open price term, and no real basis for a court to fashion a remedy.63 
Courts continue to require a strict adherence to the Code language that an 
expression of acceptance, in order not to "operate as an acceptance," must 
expressly make the acceptance conditional on the recipient's assent to the 
additional or different terms.64 
But subsection 2-207(2)(a) states that terms in a form that contains a definite 
expression of acceptance do not become part of the contract if "[t]he offer 
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer." Hence, it is important to 
determine, when three forms are used, which is the "offer" and which the 
be supplied consistently with the expressed intent of the parties. It is unfortunate that the supreme 
court did not elaborate on this point. 
61. 321 Pa. Super. at 371, 468 A.2d at 755, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1069. 
62. 669 S.W.2d 221, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1040 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
63. As to the statute of frauds, the court said that "[n]one of the writings, whether analyzed 
separately or in conjunction with each other allows for the inference that an agreement was reached 
... . "Id. at 230, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1050. 
64. Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1280, 38 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Hanford Foundry Co. v. Fuller Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
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"acceptance." This was done in Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General 
Electric Co. 65 In that case, RMT submitted numerous quotations to GE. GE 
then submitted a purchase order to RMT. RMT responded with its own 
acknowledgment of order form. Both RMT's quotations and acknowledgment 
of order form contained its standard terms. With its acknowledgment, RMT 
also objected to GE's delivery term. GE's purchase order contained the follow-
ing clause: "Acceptance of this order is expressly limited to the conditions of 
purchase printed on the reverse side." 
Relying on a statement by]. White and R. Summers that, generally, the first 
document to be sent is the offer, the court found that the quotations by RMT 
were the offers. If the property "is accurately defined and an amount stated as 
the price in a communication ... to one person individually," Williston would 
call it an offer.66 But when quotations are solicited and submitted, the business-
man's conception may be different. 67 It is noteworthy that the clause, which the 
court ruled did not make the purchase order an acceptance expressly condi-
tioned on assent, is in exact compliance with what U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a) 
requires if an offer is to nullify the effect of changed terms in an acceptance. It is 
also questionable that the purchase order contained any "definite and season-
able expression of acceptance." The strictness applied to the wording necessary 
to comply with the "unless" clause in U.C.C. section 2-207( 1) is apparently not 
to be applied to the determination of whether there is a definite and seasonable 
expression of acceptance. 
Adopting Summers' view that U.C.C. section 2-207(2) does not apply to 
different terms, the court, because the parties dealt for a while as if a contract 
existed, moved to U.C.C. section 2-207(3) and cancelled the different terms, 
which related to delivery and termination. It applied, instead, U.C.C. section 2-
309 on delivery and U.C.C. section 2-610 on anticipatory repudiation and 
entered judgment against GE. 
The case illustrates the importance of selecting the form to be characterized 
as the offer. While the result reflected the intent of the parties, it illustrates a 
major weakness in the structure of U.C.C. section 2-207 when a counteroffer is 
intended. The section allows an offeror to submit a form with the qualifying 
language of U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a) and increases the likelihood that its 
terms and conditions will apply to the contract of sale. If this result is not 
desired, the offeree must always make a counteroffer by using the exact 
language of the "unless" clause in U.C.C. section 2-207(1), lest it be deemed to 
have accepted the offeror's provisions. If the offeror uses the "you can accept 
only on my terms" approach, and the offeree uses the "unless" clause, there will 
be no contract absent conduct after the exchange of forms. But should such 
65. 585 F. Supp. 1097, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1518 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
66. See J. White & R. Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code 27 (2d ed. 1980); Williston 
on Contracts § 27 (3d ed. 1957). 
67. Businessmen frequently consider a quotation as no more than an invitation to the recipient 
to submit an offer, and for that reason neglect to include any number of important terms. See 1 A. 
Corbin, Contracts § 26, at 77 ( 1963 ). 
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conduct trigger U.C.C. section 2-207(3 ), or should it constitute a traditional 
common law acceptance of the counteroffer? The Code does not say. 
Another troublesome subsection is U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(b), which is 
applicable if neither party's form uses the appropriate magic qualifying lan-
guage, both are merchants,68 and neither reads the other's terms. The issue then 
boils down to what terms would be "material alterations." 
In one case,69 there was an oral contract followed by a written confirmation 
signed by both parties containing a disclaimer of warranties. The trial court 
found the disclaimer ineffective because U.C.C. section 2-207 could not be used 
to supply the element of explicit negotiation and bargaining required in the 
state of Washington for an effective disclaimer.70 
In another case,71 the Tenth Circuit, applying Kansas law, reversed a trial 
court's ruling that materiality was an issue of fact. The court also held that 
defendants were entitled to introduce evidence of a trade usage covering a 
"replacement or credit" limitation of liability72 and could use an invoice signed 
by both parties to impeach the president's testimony that he was not aware of 
the limitation. The unsigned invoices, the court said, constituted course-of-
dealing evidence for the jury to weigh on the issue of express agreement to the 
limitation of remedy. 
Two recent cases have indicated that a forum selection clause73 and a clause 
specifying the terms of shipment,74 as well as warranty and limitation of liability 
clauses, may be held to be material alterations. 
United States ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Construction Aggregates 
Corp. 15 involved a double application of U.C.C. section 2-207. An oral contract 
for the sale of limestone was reached on April 1, 197 6, and, thereafter, further 
documents were exchanged. On April 21, 197 6, plaintiff sent a purchase order 
specifically requiring defendant to supply all the limestone from its primary 
quarry. Defendant's letter of April 29 stated that it would use its best efforts to 
supply the limestone from its primary quarry but could not guarantee to do so. 
The court treated defendant's letter as a U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(c) objection to 
plaintiff's single-source requirement, thus deleting the additional term. Turning 
to ,subsection (2) again, defendant's best efforts clause constituted a "counter 
68. In re Kolob Lumber Co., 34 Bankr. 426, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1075 (Bankr. 
D. Or. 1983). 
69. Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 666 P.2d 899, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
42 (1983). 
70. Id. at 106, 666 P.2d at 903, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47. 
71. Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1076 (10th Cir. 1983). 
72. Id. at 765, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1086. 
73. Product Components, Inc. v. Regency Door & Hardware, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Ind. 
1983). 
74. Jn re Isis Foods, Inc., 38 Bankr. 48, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1134 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1983). 
75. 559 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Mich. 1983), ajj'd in part and rev'd in part, 738 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
1470 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 40, August 1985 
proposal" for an addition to the contract that did not materially alter the 
contract and thus became a part of it as plaintiff did not object and its purchase 
order did not contain the qualifying language of U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(a).76 
WARRANTIES 
WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS 
Even when warranty disclaimer provisions become a part of the parties' 
agreement, overriding circumstances can limit their applicability. For example, 
in Tinker u. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc.,77 warranty disclaimers were held to 
be ineffective in negating a claim based upon alleged fraudulent representations 
made by the seller of a second-hand vehicle. The seller had represented that the 
vehicle was in good operating condition and had not been involved in any major 
collision. When it was discovered that the car was titled as a "parts car," the 
purchaser initiated an action based in part upon fraud in the inducement. The 
trial court entered judgment for the seller notwithstanding the verdict, but the 
court of appeals reversed, holding that a waiver of oral representations con-
tained in the written sales agreement could not effectively bar claims amounting 
to fraud in the inducement. 78 
Finally, recent cases have also demonstrated the types of problems that may 
arise after the sale has been consummated. In Temple u. Velcro USA, Inc., 79 the 
worst fears of Velcro came to fruition when the plaintiff's husband was killed in 
the crash of a hot-air balloon that had incorporated a Velcro fastener to secure 
the deflation panels. Velcro had not been involved in the production of hot-air 
balloons, and when it discovered that its products were being used for such 
purposes, it attempted to have the FAA issue an airworthiness directive calling 
attention to the dangers of such usage. The FAA refused to issue such a 
directive, and Velcro subsequently mailed a warning to all known registered 
owners of hot-air balloons using its product that the product should not be used 
with hot-air balloons. The plaintiff's husband had received the notice and, 
despite such warnings, continued to use the hot-air balloon. In upholding the 
summary judgment in favor of Velcro, the court noted that the warning given by 
Velcro was adequate to defeat claims based on express or implied warranties.80 
Other postsale actions of the seller with regard to warranty claims can also 
adversely affect the seller, as was demonstrated in the case of Oregon Bank v. 
Nautilus Crane & Equipment Corp. 81 The court held that, just as the provi-
sions of U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(c) could operate to disclaim an implied 
warranty, so a course of performance could waive the warranty disclaimers, 
76. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) reads: "Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer." 
77. 459 So. 2d 487, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
78. Id. at 492, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1525. 
79. 148 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 196 Cal. Rptr. 531, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1108 (1983). 
80. The notice was also held effective against strict liability and negligence claims. 
81. 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1163 (1984). 
U.C.C. Survey: Sales 1471 
thereby reinstating the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose. As a result, summary judgment in favor of the seller was 
reversed. 
The standard warranty waiver provisions found in U.C.C. section 2-316 
continue to be limited by consumer-oriented legislation that either amends the 
section or provides specific consumer protection laws that supersede the section's 
application. Connecticut has recently modified U.C.C. section 2-316 to prohibit 
disclaimer of warranties involving sales of new or unused consumer goods 
unless they are marked "irregular," "factory seconds,'' or "damaged,''82 and of 
all implied warranties. New Hampshire has also amended U.C.C. section 2-316 
to prohibit disclaimers on sales of consumer goods by merchants unless a 
disclaimer that the consumer has signed is given to the consumer.83 Finally, Dale 
v. King Lincoln-Mercury, lnc. 84 ruled that the Kansas Consumer Protection 
Act85 prevents an express warranty contained in the sales contract from limiting 
the implied warranty of merchantability in cases involving consumer goods. 
WARRANTY BENEFICIARIES 
The three alternatives of U.C.C. section 2-318 inserted in 1956 affected only 
horizontal privity. The majority of the states adopted Alternative A, which 
covers only the "family or household" of the buyer and is limited to personal 
injuries. In Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems,86 an Illinois appellate 
court refused to extend privity to employees of the U.S. Postal Office despite a 
judicially created "family" relationship between a corporation and its employ-
ees. 87 Similarly, in Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp.,88 the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that under Alternative A a corporate plaintiff suing 
for lost profits and other economic loss was not injured in person "and so not .a 
third party beneficiary" of the impleaded manufacturer's warranties. 
An interesting distinction appears in N. Feldman & Son v. Checker Motors 
Corp. 89 In that case, defendant General Motors Corp., a seller of diesel engines 
82. Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 42a-2-316 (1984). 
83. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 38-A:2-316(4) (1961 & Supp. 1983). 
84. 234 Kan. 840, 676 P.2d 744, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (1984). 
85. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-639 ( 1980). 
86. 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 455 N.E.2d 142, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1116 (1983). 
Alternatively, the court held that they were not employees of the subcontractor purchaser of the 
conveyor belt system installed in the post office. Cf Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des 
Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1177 (Iowa 1984) (economic 
loss not recoverable as warranty beneficiaries by retail stores losing trade because of defective steel in 
a bridge); Pronti v. DML of Elmira, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 156, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 455 
(App. Div. 1984) (no implied warranty from a manufacturer to a subpurchaser when no personal 
injury involved). 
87. Cf. Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 238 Ark. 534, 383 S.W.2d 885, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 388 (1964); Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 197 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1967); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 459 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1073 (1974). 
88. 234 Kan. 742, 675 P.2d 887, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 69 (1984). 
89. 572 F. Supp. 310, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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to Checker, moved for summary judgment. Applying Michigan law, the court 
denied General Motors' motion with respect to the express warranty count but 
granted the motion with respect to the implied warranty of merchantability 
count. Under Michigan's version of sections 2-314 and 2-318 of the Code, 
implied warranties extend only to the family or household of the immediate 
buyer, who cannot recover for economic loss. However, specific representations 
do extend to a remote buyer if proved to be a part of the basis of the bargain, 
and economic loss is then recove.rable. 
Florida's privity rule was considered by a panel of its Third District Court of 
Appeal in GAF Corp. v. Zack Co. 90 Recovery against a seller once removed from 
plaintiff purchaser was denied. In a second case, Cedars of Lebanon Hospital 
Corp. v. European X-Ray Distributors of America, Inc., 91 another panel (on 
which sat one judge from the GAF case) traced the erosion, in both Florida and 
general law, of the privity requirement. In the absence of a clear statement by 
the Florida legislature that its version of U.C.C. section 2-318 was intended to 
abrogate all of Florida's pre-Code exceptions to privity, the court applied one to 
permit recovery against the remote manufacturer that had made direct represen-
tations to the hospital to induce it to buy x-ray equipment from a distributor. A 
footnote to the opinion emphasizes that the decision rests on direct contact 
between the manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser; absent direct contact, 
lack of privity would, it said, still defeat recovery.92 
TITLE, CREDITORS, AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 
In Monsanto Co. v. Walter E. Heller &- Co.,93 the court held that Heller was 
not a good faith buyer obtaining a better title than its transferor because Heller 
knew that its debtor was buying on credit, had an understanding with the credit 
seller that Heller would advance sufficient funds to pay for the purchases, and 
had given the credit seller reason to rely on the continuation of that practice. 
The opinion underscores the rule that in connection with merchants, at least in 
article 2 cases, a higher standard of good faith is required than for non-
merchants. 
The prior owner's attempt to recover failed in Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef 
Processors, Inc. 94 The Fifth Circuit decided that the cash sale rule, when the 
seller was not paid, did not result, as some cases have held, in a void transaction, 
but in a transaction void only as between the parties, which did not negate the 
title of a good faith purchaser from the nonpaying buyer.95 In Shell Oil Co. v. 
Mills Oil Co.,96 the unpaid credit seller contended that a bank with an inventory 
90. 445 So. 2d 350, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
91. 444 So. 2d 1068, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
92. Id. at 1072 n.4, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47 n.5. 
93. 114 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 449 N.E.2d 993, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834 (1983). 
94. 704 F.2d 1351, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 819 (5th Cir.), modified, 715 F.2d 996 
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1288 (1984). 
95. 704 F.2d at 1362, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 826. 
96. 717 F.2d 208, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 116 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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lien was not a bona fide purchaser because it had in the past honored the credit 
buyer's drafts, even if overdrafts, and had not informed the credit seller that it 
was refusing further credit to the buyer. The court held that a greater connec-
tion with the wrongful activities of the buyer was needed in order to find a 
triable issue as to lack of good faith. 
An attempt to defeat the application of U.C.C. section 2-326 by implying that 
the consignee must be a seller of the consignor's goods, even though a seller of 
similar goods, failed in a Florida appeals court case,97 and creditors of the 
consignee prevailed. The goods were delivered to the operator of a warehouse 
facility under a contract using the term "consigned," providing for the passage 
of risk of loss upon delivery to the warehouse, and requiring the warehouse 
operator to assist the owner of the goods "in any reasonable manner to protect 
the interest of Defendant [owner] 'in this consignment transaction including, 
but not limited to, execution [of] financing statement, posting of signs under a 
sign law, and otherwise.' "98 No such action was taken. Sales were made and 
invoices sent only by the owner. The warehouse operator had no authority to 
sell, but when delivery was accomplished the operator did notify the owner and 
did receive an eight percent commission on the sales. The warehouse operator 
conducted a sales business for similar items on its premises and under its own 
name. In Simonds-Shields-Theis Grain Co. v. Far-Mar-Co.,99 SST hired a 
trucker known to it to be a "sometime" dealer in soybeans to deliver beans 
under a contract it had with FMC. When delivering the grain, the trucker 
represented it as his own and was paid. SST's conversion action against the 
buyer from the trucker was defeated. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the policy of 
U.C.C. sections 2-403(2) and (3) extends to one engaged in "occasional mer-
chandising." Recovery was also defeated on common law agency and estoppel 
princi pies. 100 
TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE OF BREACH 
U.C.C. section 2-602 allows for rejection of goods "within a reasonable time 
after their delivery." During discussion of "overheating," when a new truck 
with a snowplow attachment was tested, the buyer was told that readjustment of 
97. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 440 So. 2d 666, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
98. Id. at 667, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 737. 
99. 575 F. Supp. 290, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1547 (W.D. Mo. 1983). 
100. The court said: 
A Fifth Circuit decision notes that "the phrase 'or had power to transfer' in section 2-403( 1) 
makes clear that common-law concepts of agency and estoppel (based on actual or apparent 
authority) may be invoked by a party who purchases goods from an agent or apparent agent of 
the true owner." 
Id. at 293, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1551 (quoting American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National 
Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 266 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
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the position of the blade would cure the problem. 101 Sale papers were signed, 
and a full payment check was given. But the overheating continued and was not 
cured. The buyer immediately notified the seller that it was not taking the truck, 
told the seller it was stopping payment on the check (it did so), and told the 
seller to repossess the truck. 
Instead, claiming acceptance by the buyer, seller processed the title papers, 
and title was duly issued in buyer's name. The court held that the case was one 
of rejection, that "[a] 'reasonable time to inspect' under the UCC must allow an 
opportunity to put the product to its intended use, or for testing to verify its 
capability to perform as intended."102 The notice given was sufficient because it 
indicated the relief wanted and was timely for the purpose. 
The conflict between two sentences in comment 4 to U.C.C. section 2-607 
regarding the required content of notice continues to cause trouble. 103 One group 
of cases relating to warranties follows the "still troublesome" first sentence. 104 
Another group follows the "claimed to involve a breach" rule of the last 
sentence. 105 
Without regard to the slightly different language regarding notice in U.C.C. 
section 2-608(2), cases frequently use the same tripartite statement of the 
purposes of notice106 found in comment 5 to this section, perhaps because it 
seems to imply that the purposes are the same. 
As to the timing of the notice, there are examples of a division between cases 
treating the notice as a "condition precedent to suit" in order to afford time for 
101. Capitol Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 114 (1983). 
102. Id. at 119. 
103. The first sentence of the second paragraph of comment 4 reads: "The content of notification 
need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be 
watched." The last sentence states: "The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this 
Article need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, 
and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation." 
104. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 429 (11th Cir. 1983); International Technical Instruments, Inc. v. Engineering 
Measurements Co., 678 P.2d 558, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 868 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). 
105. Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 469 (D. Del. 1984); Barrington Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co., 447 So. 2d 785, 38 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 744 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76, 
472 A.2d 1250, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 818 (1984). 
106. Comment 5 indicates that the "purposes" of the requirement of notice are "considerations 
of good faith, prevention of surprise, and reasonable adjustment." It has been said that these 
purposes are met if the notice informs the seller that the buyer has revoked, giving identification of 
the particular goods he has revoked and setting forth the nature of the nonconformity. Solar Kinetics 
Corp. v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1237, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 85 
(D. Conn. 1980). 
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settlement107 and those holding that a timely filing of suit satisfies the notice 
requirement. 108 
Smith v. Stewart 109 involved the purchase of a yacht. Neither party was a 
merchant, but the seller gave an express warranty against any dry rot discovered 
within six months. Three days after delivery of the boat, the buyer notified the 
seller of a fuel tank leak and requested defrayal of the expense of repairing the 
tank. In the ensuing discussions, congeniality turned to hostility, and both 
parties retained attorneys. A few days before the end of the six-month period, 
dry rot was discovered, but the seller was not notified. About three weeks later, 
buyer filed suit for both the fuel tank repairs and the dry rot. The trial court 
entered summary judgment for seller on all claims because there was no implied 
warranty of merchantability since the seller was not a "boat-merchant," and 
also because buyer had given no notice of breach regarding the dry rot. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed as to the fuel tank leak and 
reversed as to the dry rot. Adopting the White and Summers view of the 
purposes behind the notice requirement,110 the court had to face the extensive 
case law and scholarly comment supporting the condition precedent approach 
with its personal injury relaxation111 and its third-party beneficiary exception.112 
Without expressly creating an "already in a hostile position" exception to the 
notice rules as such, the court held that filing suit constituted sufficient notice in 
this case. 
In Shooshanian v. Wagner, 113 the Alaska Supreme Court said in a consumer 
breach of warranty suit, "The filing of a complaint is certainly not a bar to the 
negotiation and settlement of claims. To the contrary, the prospect of going to 
trial is often a powerful incentive to a defendant to investigate the claims against 
it and to arrive at a reasonable agreement."114 The court, in reversing an order 
dismissing a complaint with prejudice, also said that a defendant could more 
easily prepare for either settlement or trial through the use of pretrial discovery 
techniques. The court added that "[a]llowing a consumer's complaint to serve as 
notice will not prevent a defendant manufacturer from raising the issue of 
timeliness if it has been prejudiced by an unreasonable delay."115 
107. The court in Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 667 P.2d 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1141 (1983), was generally supportive of this view. 
108. Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Scrv. (Callaghan) 903 
(S.D. Ill. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150 (Colo. 1984). 
109. 233 Kan. 904, 667 P.2d 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1141 (1983). 
110. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 66, § 11-10. 
111. See generally id. 
112. Id. 
113. 672 P.2d 455, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 55 (Alaska 1983). 
114. Id. at 462-63, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 59. 
115. Id. at 463, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 59-60. 
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A notice once given may have to be renewed if buyer's intervening conduct 
lulls a reasonable seller into believing that the defect has been cured or has 
disappeared. 116 
The intermesh of a buyer's right to revoke acceptance and a seller's right to 
cure by replacement rather than repair was before the Texas Supreme Court in 
Gappelberg v. Landrum. 117 The intermediate appellate court, reversing the trial 
court, had distinguished cases denying the right to cure on the ground that they 
involved only the right to cure by repair. It held that the "spirit of the Code" 
required the allowance of cure by complete replacement. The supreme court 
reversed, citing Zabriskie Chevrolet Inc. v. Smith 118 for its theory of "shaken 
faith" in a product, in this case a large-screen television, that had an undiscov-
ered substantial defect when accepted. 
REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE 
The demand for assurances provision, U.C.C. section 2-609, was considered 
in Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co. 119 The Canal 
Company had chartered a tug with an option to purchase. Nineteen days before 
the final charter payment was due, the Canal Company wrote the owner that it 
had discovered that one of the mortgages on the tug was in default and 
demanded assurances that clear title to the tug would be available on or before 
the date for the exercise of the option. It stated that it was withholding 
payments until it received assurances and did so. No answer was given except 
by a suit, filed two days after the due date of the payment, for the return of the 
boat. The district court gave judgment to the now-bankrupt plaintiff. 
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the U.C.C. governed the contract for 
sale under federal law, whether common law or admiralty. The owner claimed 
that, under U.C.C. section 2-609, withholding payment was not "commercially 
reasonable" as the Canal Company had made no investigation of the owner's 
financial condition and payments on the mortgages could obviously be made 
from the lease rentals. 120 The court held that if the owner was in fine financial 
shape, all it had to do in response to the request for assurances "was to explain 
the situation." The standard for demanding assurances is "one of reasonable 
insecurity, not absolute certainty."121 The withholding of payment (suspension 
of performance) was reasonable when the request for assurances was greeted by 
absolute silence. 
116. Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76, 472 A.2d 1250, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
818 (1984 ). 
117. 666 S.W.2d 88, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1563 (Tex. 1984). 
118. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 30 (1968). 
119. 730 F.2d 186, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 490 (5th Cir. 1984). 
120. Id. at 190, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 496. 
121. Id. at 191, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 497. 
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Consolidated Edison Co. v. Charles F. Guyon, Inc. 122 shows that the party 
giving assurances can go too far. Defendant had contracted to supply a quantity 
of fabricated piping but thereafter decided to shut down its fabricating division. 
Consolidated Edison asked for a confirmation in nine days that the pipe would 
still be supplied. U.C.C. section 2-609 provides that the demand for assurances 
must be in writing but says nothing about how the assurances should be given. 
Summary judgment on liability issues was granted, as the proffered oral 
"assurances" were that defendant would place the order with another supplier 
if Consolidated Edison would look solely to that supplier with respect to any 
product liability for unfinished merchandise. 123 A proffered novation does not 
constitute assurances. 
The doctrine of impracticality of performance resulted in a reversal of a $5 
million judgment due to improper jury instructions that, in effect, constituted 
directed verdicts on certain issues in Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Interna-
tional, Ltd. 124 The case arose from a termination of plaintiff's distributorship of 
valves imported by Conval. Defendant did not fill two orders placed before 
termination and urged impracticality as an excuse. 
The Ninth Circuit construed the contract as one to supply from an agreed 
source, since prices were tied to prices charged defendant by a specified 
Yugoslavian company. The court then ruled that the failure to supply by the 
agreed source would constitute impracticality only if defendant had used all due 
measures to assure that its supplier would perform, and the evidence on that 
issue raised a jury question. 
The second and more interesting aspect was the failure of Conval to assign to 
Zidell all of Conval's rights against the supplier. Despite the comment's 
statement that a condition of "making good the claim of excuse" is the assign-
ment, the court declined to make the failure to assign a per se invalidation of the 
impracticality excuse. The jury should decide, it ruled, whether in view of all 
the circumstances there was any breach of good faith in failing to assign the 
rights. 
The gyrations in the world oil market in 1979 and thereafter have produced 
at least three resorts to U.C.C. section 2-615, of which two will be discussed. In 
Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminum International Corp., 125 a contract 
for petroleum to be refined in Taiwan was involved. The contract contained a 
force majeure clause, which excused a performance if the specified events 
occurred before departure of the vessel from a loading port in the Persian Gulf. 
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's holding that the force 
majeure clause excused the seller if its supplier failed to supply "for any reason 
whatsoever, as long as the vessel had not been loaded." The circuit court then 
ruled that U.C.C. section 2-615 had no application as the events that occurred 
122. 98 A.D.2d 483, 471 N.Y.S.2d 269, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1132 (App. Div. 
1984). 
123. Id. at 484-85, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 270, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1132-33. 
124. 719 F.2d 1465, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 466 (9th Cir. 1983). 
125. 719 F.2d 992, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 779 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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were foreseeable and the clause represented the parties' bargain as to who 
should bear the loss.126 The panel then held that the covenant of good faith, 
which the California courts had read into force majeure clauses, does not 
include the obligation to allow the buyer to succeed to the excused seller's rights 
against its supplier. The windfall of any such recovery, based on the absence of 
any excusing clause in seller's contract with its supplier, belonged to the seller 
by reason of its superior bargaining. 
In Nissho-lwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 127 a jury awarded Nissho 
damages for Occidental's failure to deliver oil from Libya. Occidental urged as 
excuses an embargo by the Libyan government and pipeline breakdowns. The 
trial judge instructed the jury that it must find that the excusing event or events 
were not reasonably within the control of Occidental or its supplier. The Fifth 
Circuit held the instruction to be proper. The concept of an American jury 
determining whether Occidental provoked Colonel Khadafy's actions or 
whether his actions were beyond its reasonable control raises interesting specu-
lations. 
REMEDIES 
REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE 
In Bowlin 's Inc. v. Ramsay Oil Co., 128 the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
upheld a contractual two-day clause for objection to deliveries of gasoline to 
service stations. The claim of an unconscionably short time was defeated by a 
showing that the purchaser's "Procedures for Verifying the Quantity of Gaso-
line Delivered to Your Store," if followed, would have enabled each outlet to 
verify quantities within hours after delivery. 129 
At the other end of the spectrum is Sumner v. Fel-Air, lnc.,130 in which 
repeated assurances that a substantial defect would be cured worked to extend 
the period for revocation of acceptance. 
The "reasonable" time for rejection was extended in In re H.P. Tool 
Manufacturing Corp. 131 In order for inspection to be made, the seller would 
have had to depart from normal procedures, open each carton of tool sets, and 
unroll the pouches. Hence, notice given after receipt of complaints from custom-
ers was timely and effective to revoke acceptance. The resales did not constitute 
an improper exercise of dominion. 
On the other hand, shoes are different from tool sets. In Lorenzo Ban.ft di 
Ban.ft Renzo & Co. v. Davis Congress Shops, Inc., 132 rejection failed when 
delivery was taken in early summer 1982 and notice of nonconformity was given 
126. Id. at 999, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 788. 
127. 729 F.2d 1530, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1237 (5th Cir. 1984). 
128. 99 N.M. 660, 662 P.2d 661, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 11 to (N.M. Ct. App. 
1983). 
129. Id. at __ , 662 P.2d at 670, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1122. 
130. 680 P.2d 1109, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 91 (Alaska 1984). 
131. 37 Bankr. 885, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). 
132. 568 F. Supp. 432, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
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in mid-August, but the shoes were continuously offered for sale and half had 
been sold by April 1983. 
RECLAMATION 
In Myers v. Columbus Sales Pavilion, lnc.,133 an unpaid cash seller sued the 
buyer's auctioneer. The district court, affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on the 
basis of the district court's opinion by Judge Urbom, ruled that under U.C.C. 
section 2-507(2), title passed from seller to buyer, and that U.C.C. section 2-
401 ( 4) is an exclusive listing of the circumstances in which title, having passed, 
is revested in a seller. U.C.C. section 2-507(2) was said to speak only of the 
buyer's right, as against the seller, to retain or dispose of the purchased cattle,134 
not of a revesting of title. Hence, the rights of third parties were not affected and 
the auctioneer committed no conversion, as the seller had no property interest in 
the cattle. 
A better approach would have applied the "innocent agent" rule to the 
auctioneer135 or have equated the position of the auctioneer to that of a good 
faith purchaser. 
Finally, the district court judge, Judge Urbom, had applied the Nebraska 
statute136 relieving an auctioneer of liability for conversion when selling personal 
property at auction in good faith and without notice of a security interest, 
provided that the principal is disclosed and the auctioneer has no interest in the 
property except to act as an intermediary. The Eighth Circuit, however, 
affirmed only the U.C.C. analysis leading to "no conversion." It then stated that 
the portion of Judge Urbom's opinion considering the Nebraska statute "is to be 
regarded as surplusage, and we express no view thereon." 137 
The Tenth Circuit considered the effect of Kansas law on a secured party 
dealing with a nonpaying buyer when reclamation was sought under U.C.C. 
section 2-507(2). 138 It held that the return of the buyer's check defeated the 
buyer's title, so that it never had rights in the purchased goods to support the 
grant of a security interest. It then went on to rule, however, that because the 
seller failed to pursue its right to reclaim diligently, the sale was no longer 
conditional and the buyer could sell or give a security interest. 
Unfortunately for the Tenth Circuit, the Kansas Supreme Court reached the 
opposite result three months later in Iola State Bank v. Bolan. 139 Involved were 
133. 575 F. Supp. 805, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1122 (D. Neb.), ajf'd, 723 F.2d 37, 
37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1128 (8th Cir. 1983). 
134. 575 F. Supp. at 808, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1125. District Judge Urbom ruled that 
plaintiff could not recover in conversion as title had passed from plaintiff and U.C.C. § 2-507 did 
not provide the unpaid seller even a security interest. Id., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1125. 
135. Compare the position of a selling agent or broker under U.C.C. §§ 3-417(4) and 3-419(3). 
Compare also U.C.C. §§ 2-312(2) and 2-328(4), referring to auctioneer's principal as "the seller." 
136. Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 69-109.01(Reissue1981). 
137. 723 F.2d at 38, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1130. 
138. Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1553 (10th Cir. 1983). 
139. 235 Kan. 175, 679 P.2d 720, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 755 (1984). 
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farmer sellers of grain, a merchant buyer, and the after-acquired property 
clause of the bank's security agreement with the buyer. The court considered 
that the Code radically changed the Kansas pre-Code "cash sale" rule from 
"void" to "voidable." Thus, unpaid sellers in Kansas were now subject to the 
claims of good faith purchasers from the nonpaying buyer. Unfortunately for it, 
the bank that dishonored the checks was the same bank that claimed purchaser 
status under its security agreement. The bank was found to have knowledge that 
the funds in the account belonged to the farmers, so that its setoff of the buyer's 
balance was distinctly not in good faith. The trial court's direction of a verdict in 
favor of the farmers for both compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive 
damages was sustained. 
While the issue of good faith was not considered by the trial court or jury, the 
appellate court ruled that the trial judge's findings made clear that the bank had 
not acted honestly in fact; hence, as a matter of law, the bank was not a good 
faith purchaser140 and so had converted the farmers' money, a tort allowing 
recovery of punitive damages. 
The issue whether a secured party, claiming as a good faith purchaser, must 
have advanced money after the goods were delivered, possibly implicit in the 
two preceding cases, was thought by many to have been put to rest by In re 
Samuels & Co. 141 Possibly emboldened by the rash of contrary statutes and the 
federal enactment following that case, 142 Bankruptcy Judge Emil F. Goldhaber, 
departing from the views of many of his colleagues,143 ruled in Lavonia Manu-
facturing Corp. v. Emery Corp. (In re Emery Corp.)1 44 that a secured party, to 
prevail over the reclaiming seller under U.C.C. section 2-702(3 ), must "take" 
the interest by giving value during the period after receipt of the goods and 
before the reclamation demand is made. 145 
140. Id. at--, 679 P.2d at 730-31, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 767. Because a directed verdict 
was the correct result even though the trial court's reasoning was not applicable, the court ruled that 
the verdict should stand. Id. at __ , 679 P.2d at 731, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 767-68. The court 
also ruled that the bank, because of its knowledge, had no common law or statutory right of setoff 
against the farmers' funds. Id. at __ , 679 P.2d at 733-34, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 772. 
141. 526 F.2d 1238, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 545 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
834 (1976). The Kansas court cites 10 other opinions reaching the same result. 
142. The initial adverse reaction to Samuels can be seen in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, §§ 9-138, 
-139 (West Supp. 1984-1985); 3A Kan. Stat. Ann.§§ 47-1801, -1802 (1981); Ten. Civ. Code Ann. 
tit. 121, art. 6910(b) (Vernon 1960), repealed in 1981 (Vernon Supp. 1985); 1976 Cal. Stat. 772 
(Assembly Bill 3485). Then came the federal statute, Pub. L. No. 94-410, 90 Stat. 1249 (Sept. 13, 
1976), explained in H.R. Rep. No. 94-1043 (Apr. 14, 1976). 
143. See, for example, Judge Goldhaber's footnotes 9 and 10. Lavonia Mfg. Corp. v. Emery 
Corp. (In re Emery Corp.), 38 Bankr. 489, 495, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834, at 842-43 
(Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1984). 
144. 38 Bankr. 489, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). Contra In 
re Bensar Co., 36 Bankr. 699, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 823 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984). 
145. The judge posed two alternatives: first, that the U.C.C. displaced state common law and 
that rights of creditors must be found under article 2 (Pennsylvania has the 1966 amendment to 
U.C.C. § 2-702); and second, state law has not been displaced. Under Pennsylvania law, Mann v. 
Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901), and In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 159 (3d Cir. 1960), the judge concluded that only a "reliance interest" is protected. He 
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If electronic means are used to transmit the demand for reclamation, when is 
the demand made? Montello Oil Corp. v. Marin Motor Oil, Inc. (In re Marin 
Motor Oil Co.)146 involved a last day for demand on April 21, 1981. At 11 :04 
p.m. that day, a telex was sent to the buyer and was received by Western 
Union's office serving the buyer at 11:08 p.m. The message was not in readable 
form until the buyer opened for business and turned on its machine at 9:04 a.m. 
on April 22, 1981. The Third Circuit panel adopted a "dispatch" rule for the 
timeliness of demands. Factors justifying its decision were said to be the 
difficulty of proof of receipt, the uncertainty of proving just where the message 
was between 11 :08 p.m. and 9:04 a.m. the next day, and the lack of any guiding 
policy as to the purpose of a demand. The policy selected was that of favoring 
certainty in the law. The opinion states that under a dispatch rule the method of 
communication chosen by the seller must be commercially reasonable in the 
light of past practices between the parties and in the industry. 147 
BUYER'S MONEY REMEDIES; LIMITATIONS ON 
REMEDIES AND DAMAGES 
Although comment 2 to U.C.C. section 2-715 explicitly rejects the "tacit 
agreement" test, defendants persistently argue that consequential damages are 
recoverable only if they were contemplated at the time of contracting. Courts 
continue to reject the argument. 148 
In McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co.,149 the Oregon Supreme Court 
reversed the intermediate appellate court's allowance, to a buyer revoking 
acceptance, of the cost of renting a substitute automobile as "cover," and 
remanded to determine if recovery could be had as consequential damages. It is 
clear, however, that the rental was neither cover nor "incidental damages" and 
could be recovered, if at all, only as consequential damages, subject to the 
validity of a clause in the contract excluding consequential damages. 
The remand will require Oregon to take a position on whether a revocation 
of acceptance, when a repair or replacement limited remedy fails of its essential 
analyzed U.C.C. § 2-702 to indicate that divestiture of the right to reclaim must be triggered by an 
action of the purchaser or buyer in ordinary course occurring after delivery and before demand is 
made. There are those on the subcommittee who believe that the judge is in error. 
146. 740 F.2d 22n, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1425 (3d Cir. 1984). 
147. The case also involved an issue as to the date the goods were "received" by the buyer. The 
court applied U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c)'s definition of receipt, not as controlling state law, but as a rule 
suitable for federal purposes. Thus, goods were not "received" while in the possession of a common 
carrier, even one selected by the buyer. The seller's right of stoppage in transitu under U.C.C. § 2-
705 indicated that the buyer did not have unfettered possession; hence, there was no receipt until 
delivery to a bailee acting exclusively for the buyer. Id. at 224-25, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1432-33. 
148. See, e.g., Elar Invs., Inc. v. Southwest Culvert Co., 139 Ariz. 25, 28, 676 P.2d 659, 662, 38 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 138, 141 (1983). 
149. 295 Or. 494, 668 P.2d 365, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 130 (1983) (en bane). 
1482 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 40, August 1985 
purpose, also defeats the contractual exclusion of consequential damages. 160 
Attacks on such exclusion clauses as "unconscionable" continue to fail in a 
commercial context. 151 
Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp. 152 joins with the cases holding that interest 
on money borrowed to make a purchase is not recoverable when the buyer is 
awarded lump sum damages. The rationale is that the awarded damages permit 
a replacement purchase to be made without additional borrowing. But the 
extended time factor where interest is paid without obtaining the benefit of use 
of the product is ignored. On the other hand, interest on money borrowed to 
make repairs because of defendant's breach qualifies as consequential dam-
ages.153 But for the breach, the money would not have been borrowed. 
In Nezperce Storage Co. v. Zenner, 154 Nezperce bought wheat from Zenner, 
who expressly warranted it to be spring wheat. Zenner knew that Nezperce 
would process the grain into spring wheat seed and then resell it. Under their 
contract, Zenner was obliged to indemnify Nezperce for losses suffered upon 
resale. When the seed proved defective, Nezperce felt it was forced to settle with 
its buyers. As the jury found that the settlement amounts were reasonable, the 
court allowed their recovery as consequential damages. Without a finding that 
the settlements were reasonable, recovery would ordinarily be denied. An 
indemnity against loss ordinarily does not grant checking privileges on the 
indemnitor. 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS-INTERACTION OF 
TORT, CONTRACT, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 
STATUTES 
In view of the difficulty of distinguishing causes of action in contract from 
those in tort, the four-year statute of limitations contained in U.C.C. section 2-
725 continues to spawn conflicting decisions. When the defect resulted solely in 
economic loss, most courts thought U.C.C. section 2-725 governed,155 even to the 
150. Leary & Frisch, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales, 
Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 39 Bus. Law. 1851, 1897 (1984) (discussing the existing 
division of opinion). 
151. Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1076 (10th Cir. 1983); Frantz Lithographic Serv., Inc. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 485 (E.D. Pa. 1984 ); In re Feder Li tho-Graphic Servs., Inc., 40 Bankr. 486, 39 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 495 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). 
152. 35 Wash. App. 414, 667 P.2d 117, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 141 (1983). 
153. Metropolitan Transfer Station, Inc. v. Design Structures, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 532, 36 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 860 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982). 
154. 105 Idaho 464, 670 P.2d 871, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 478 (1983). 
155. Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 860 (8th Cir. 1983); Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191Conn.150, 464 A.2d 18, 37 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 158 (1983). But see Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 191 N.J. Super. 22, 465 A.2d 530, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 62 (App. Div. 1983). 
Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a request for a writ of certiorari, and its decision 
(not available at this writing) should clarify the law in New Jersey and be of guidance elsewhere. 
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exclusion of the jurisdiction's general limitations statute for breach of con-
tract.166 If personal injury is the result, the only discernible trend is towards 
uncertainty. Two federal district courts following the laws of Delaware167 and 
Indiana168 found each state's enactment of U.C.C. section 2-725 applicable. In 
contrast, federal courts employing the laws of Kansas169 and Virginia160 applied 
the state statute of limitations applicable to tort or personal injury actions. 
Opinion also continues divided on the proper statute of limitations when the 
action is for indemnity. 161 
Another aspect of U.C.C. section 2-725 involves the time of accrual of a cause 
of action for breach of warranty. Although the accrual date is normally when 
delivery is tendered, the Code also adopts a "time of discovery" rule "where a 
warranty explicitly extends to future performance . . . and discovery of~t.he 
breach must await the time of such performance."162 An express warranty that 
"(r]oof surface and installation shall be guaranteed unconditionally for a period 
of five years and any leakage occurring within that time shall be promptly 
repaired or replaced" was held to be such a warranty .163 Confusing the concepts 
of warranty and remedy, the court then held that the cause of action did not 
arise when the leak was discovered but when it became apparent that the 
defendant would be unable to effectively repair or replace the roof. 
Other decisions within this reporting period hold that neither a five-year 
guarantee,164 nor the commitment to future repair or replacement,166 constitutes 
a future warranty within the meaning of the U.C.C. section 2-725(2) exception. 
156. Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1076 (10th Cir. 1983). 
157. Sellon v. General Motors Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1094, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1169 (D. Del. 1983). 
158. Tolen v. A.H. Robins Co., 570 F. Supp. 1146, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 790 
(N.D. Ind. 1983). 
159. Thomas v. Heinrich Equip. Corp., 563 F. Supp. 152, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
866 (D. Kan. 1983). 
160. Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1569 (4th Cir. 
1983). 
161. Compare Anixter Bros. v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 947, 463 N.E.2d 
913, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 28 (1984) (U.C.C. § 2-725 not applicable to implied 
contract indemnity actions; five-year "other civil action" statute applies), with Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1274 (Utah 1984) 
(ultimate buyer's action is for breach of warranty; hence, indemnity action barred by U .C.C. § 2-
725 ). 
162. u.c.c. § 2-725(2). 
163. Smith v. Union Supply Co., 675 P.2d 333, 334, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 795, 795 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983). 
164. Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 214, 37 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
165. Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 1266, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1222, 1228 (D. Del. 1983) ("Thus, the key distinction between these two kinds of 
warranties is that a repair or replacement warranty merely provides a remedy if the product 
becomes defective, while a warranty for future performance guarantees the performance of the 
product itself for a stated period of time") (emphasis in original). 
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Furthermore, the requirements for a future performance warranty were not met 
by General Motors' warranty: "To help protect you, every Olds provides all 
this for occupant protection ... Fuel Tank impact security."166 
BULK TRANSFERS 
In those states that have adopted optional U.C.C. section 6-106, one problem 
is how to distribute the proceeds of sale if they are insufficient to pay all claims 
in full. Section 6-106(3) provides that "distribution shall be made pro rata." In 
William lselin &- Co. v. Delta Auction &- Real Estate Co.,167 the court did not 
apply this language literally and ruled that secured and judicial lien creditors 
are entitled to priority in a distribution of proceeds. 168 Assuming that the 
original judicial lien also extends to proceeds, as does a security interest, 169 the 
court's conclusion seems correct. 170 There is no evidence that the drafters of 
article 6 intended to alter existing priority schemes. 
In In re Radcliffe's Warehouse Sales, lnc., 171 the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Washington held that section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code 
did not extend the time for the trustee of the transferor to sue the transferee to 
set aside a noncomplying bulk transfer. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
disapproved of In re Curtina International, lnc. 172 and held that section 108(a) 
did not apply because the right being asserted against the transferee is a right of 
the creditors of the transferor/debtor, not the right of the debtor itself. Although 
this is true, the trustee acquires his cause of action pursuant to section 544(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, and section 546(a) gives the trustee two years within 
which to sue. This should preempt the shorter article 6 period. Unfortunately, 
the court in Radcliffe's did not discuss sections 544(b) and 546, and the court in 
Curtina wrongly said that section 546 did not apply while section 108(a) did. 
Two cases involved the scope of article 6. In one the Virginia Supreme Court 
held an enterprise not subject to article 6 because, despite an extensive inventory 
of replacement parts, its principal business was repairing radiators, a service, 
166. Sellon v. General Motors Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1094, 1097, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1169, 1172(0. Del.1983). 
167. 433 So. 2d 911, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 607 (Miss. 1983). 
168. Accord Huguelet v. M & M Assocs., 375 So. 2d 1150, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Bomanzi of Lexington, Inc. v. Tafel, 415 S.W.2d 627, 4 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 588 (Ky. 1967); In re Bulk Sale of Clement, 98 Dauph. 55, 71 Pa. D. & 
C.2d 717, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1280 (C.P. 1976). 
169. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). 
170. At least one member of the subcommittee feels that theoretically § 6-106(3) should be 
applied literally because the secured creditor can still foreclose on the collateral once it is in the 
transferee's hands and, therefore, does not need to be given preferential treatment in the distribution 
of the proceeds. Another member believes that the treatment should depend on whether the bulk 
sales price was reduced by the secured debt, that is, whether the bulk sale was "under and subject" 
or not. 
171. 31 Bankr. 827, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). 
172. 23 Bankr. 969, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1311 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
U.C.C. Survey: Sales 1485 
and not the sale of merchandise from stock. 173 The other case involved a sale of 
fixed assets and an option to purchase the inventory at a future date. There was 
no compliance with article 6, but the transferee agreed to pay a secured party 
some of the outstanding balance owed by the debtor. The court ruled that the 
bulk transfer article does not regulate an agreement to sell inventory in the 
future. Until sold, the inventory remains subject to the vendor's creditors. 
Alternatively, a sale for the benefit of the secured party would also be exempt 
even if to a third person by the debtor. 174 
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING, AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
There were no startlingly significant decisions under article 7. 
173. Allsbrook v. Azalea Radiator Serv., Inc., 316 S.E.2d 743, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 1714 (Va. 1984). 
174. Ouachita Elec. Co-op v. Evans-St. Clair, 12 Ark. App. 171, 672 S.W.2d 660, 39 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 640 ( 1984 ). 

